Unit Two: Peacemakers and Nonviolence
Lesson 4: Mkhuseli Jack

Standards Addressed by Lesson: **CIVICS** Standard 4.3 Students know how citizens can exercise their rights. (d) Describing and evaluating historical or current examples of citizen movements to ensure rights of all citizens. Standard 4.4 Students know how citizens can participate in civic life. (a -d) **HISTORY** Standard 5.3 Students know how political power has been acquired, maintained, used and/or lost throughout history. (b)

Objectives of Lesson: To introduce and discuss Mkhuseli Jack and the nonviolent strategies used in the South African movement to end apartheid. This session also introduces additional nonviolent strategies.

Instructional Strategies: Reading, writing activity, discussion

Preliminary Lesson Preparation: Educator should read attached summary of the movement to end apartheid to be familiar with the issue before facilitating this lesson (Attachment A). Educator should also watch the 30-minute segment of the video to prepare answers for the questions.

Vocabulary: Apartheid, townships (designated places where Blacks lived)

Suggested Resources to Obtain: -The movie, *A Force More Powerful: A Century of Nonviolent Conflict*, Peter Ackerman and Jack Duvall, PBS

Suggested Time: Between 50 and 60 minutes

Materials Needed: Video: *A Force More Powerful: A Century of Nonviolent Conflict*, "Freedom in Our Lifetime" segment
Copies of follow-up Questions (Attachment C)

Attachments:
A. Summary of movement to end apartheid
B. Nonviolent Strategies Brainstorm responses
C. Follow-up questions for film
D. Questions for crumple ball activity

Lesson Outline

Introduction to Lesson:

This lesson focuses on another peacemaker, Mkhuseli Jack, and the movement in South Africa to end apartheid through nonviolent means. Students will also be encouraged to pull from their own experiences and knowledge to come up with various nonviolent strategies. The lesson begins by having students watch a 30-minute segment from *A Force More Powerful* entitled "Freedom in Our Lifetime" on Mkhuseli Jack in South Africa. Students should receive the questions before the movie; then go over questions that can be answered by watching the movie. The video clip will be followed by a discussion of the questions and a brainstorm.

Icebreaker / Quick Activity to Assess Prior Learning:

Begin by asking students if they are familiar with apartheid in South Africa. Have them come up with a description and brief history of apartheid. Supplement their knowledge with your own and with what is provided (Attachment A).

See attached summary of movement to end apartheid for important points students should be familiar with. This is a good time to make sure students know what apartheid and townships are.

Activities

Activity 1: A Force More Powerful

Have students watch the 30-minute segment "Freedom in Our Lifetime" covering South Africa. Before starting the video, go over the questions with the students and make sure they are clear. There should be some time after the video for questions to be answered.

Discussion Questions:

A Force More Powerful - South Africa 1985

1. Who were the people and groups involved in supporting or challenging apartheid in South Africa?
2. What were those challenging apartheid trying to achieve?
3. What nonviolent strategies did they use?
4. Why did they choose these strategies?
5. Do you think these strategies are still relevant today?

After the film, allow about 5 minutes for students to complete their questions. Start with question number one to see how students responded.

Activity 2: Brainstorm on Nonviolent Strategies

If there is still time, this activity will allow students to draw from what they've learned in class, their own experiences, or their own creativity to think of other nonviolent strategies. See Attachment B for some ideas the class may come up with. This can be an important exercise to help them see that nonviolent strategies are still relevant today and can be applied to issues that are close to home (poverty, peace movement, etc.) The point to make here is that a nonviolent strategy doesn't have to be on such a large scale as what MLK did, for example. It can be something very simple that challenges injustice, making the choice NOT to cooperate with

injustice by becoming a vegetarian, by choosing NOT to buy certain products, etc. There ARE things that we can do on a personal basis to live our lives based on principles of nonviolence.

Helpful Hints / Comments from Previous Facilitators:

If class seems to be having a hard time responding to the questions, ask them more specific questions. For question number one, for example, what were the specific things you saw Mkhuseli Jack doing to address the issue of apartheid? Who was he working with? Who was he trying to organize? Who supported apartheid and why?

To help students think about the difference between radical social change through violent and nonviolent means the educator can ask: (These questions are intended to help students recognize that while social change DID come about in our history through violence, injustice HAS been effectively challenged through nonviolent means as well.)

- What were some violent movements in our history that have led to social change? (The American Revolution and the Civil War, for example.)

- Who are some nonviolent actors that we've learned about in this class? (Gandhi, MLK, Dorothy Day, etc).

- How have the nonviolent movements been effective?

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Attachment A: Summary of Movement to End Apartheid

Apartheid: A policy of racial segregation formerly followed in South Africa. The word *apartheid* means "separateness" in the Afrikaans language and it described the rigid racial division between the governing white minority population and the nonwhite majority population. The National Party introduced apartheid as part of their campaign in the 1948 elections, and with the National Party victory, apartheid became the governing political policy for South Africa until the early 1990s. The apartheid laws classified people according to three major racial groups—white; Bantu, or black Africans; and Colored, or people of mixed descent. Later Asians, or Indians and Pakistanis, were added as a fourth category. The laws determined where members of each group could live, what jobs they could hold, and what type of education they could receive. Laws prohibited most social contact between races, authorized segregated public facilities, and denied any representation of nonwhites in the national government.

Taken from Encarta Encyclopedia
http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia_761561373/Apartheid.html

Summary of movement to end apartheid, biographies of main players in the movement

In 1985, a wave of unrest against apartheid begins to sweep across the black townships in South Africa. Security forces try to control the unrest via a provocative containment policy that incites dangerous confrontations. Impatient youths and others initiate sporadic violence. Black leaders are routinely harassed and imprisoned.

In the city of Port Elizabeth, Mikhuseli Jack, a charismatic 27-year-old youth leader, understands that violence is no match for the state's awesome arsenal. Jack stresses the primacy of cohesion and coordination, forming street committees and recruiting neighborhood leaders to represent their interests and settle disputes. Nationally, a fledgling umbrella party, the United Democratic Front (UDF), asserts itself through a series of low-key acts of defiance, such as rent boycotts, labor strikes, and school stayaways.

Advocating nonviolent action appeals to black parents who are tired of chaos in their neighborhoods. The blacks of Port Elizabeth agree to launch an economic boycott of the city's white-owned businesses. Extending the struggle to the white community is a calculated maneuver designed to sensitize white citizens to the blacks' suffering. Beneath their appeal to conscience, the blacks' underlying message is that businesses cannot operate against a backdrop of societal chaos and instability.

Confronted by this and other resistance in the country, the government declares a state of emergency, the intent of which is to splinter black leadership through arbitrary arrests and curfews. Jack and his compatriots, however, receive an entirely different message: the country is fast becoming ungovernable. Apartheid has been cracked.

Undaunted by government reprisals, the UDF continues to press its demands, particularly for the removal of security forces and the release of jailed African National Congress leader Nelson

Mandela. White retailers, whose business districts have become moribund, demand an end to the stalemate. The movement also succeeds in turning world opinion against apartheid, and more sanctions are imposed on South Africa as foreign corporations begin to pull out many investments. In June 1986, the South African government declares a second state of emergency to repress the mass action that has paralyzed the regime.

By 1989, the stand-off between the black majority and the government impels the new prime minister, F.W. de Klerk, to lift the ban on illegal political organizations and free Mandela. In 1994, South Africa's first truly democratic national election elects Mandela to the nation's presidency.

Mkhuseli Jack

Mkhuseli Jack was raised on the farmlands of South Africa's Eastern Cape and knew nothing of anti-apartheid politics, the imprisonment of Nelson Mandela, or the efforts for freedom launched by the African National Congress when he moved to the industrial city of Port Elizabeth in search of a high school education. He was radicalized by the apartheid laws that kept him from enrolling in a city school. With the support of local organizations, he gained admission and developed as a natural leader of his peers. He founded and headed the Port Elizabeth Youth Congress and became deeply involved in the emerging civic movement that led to his subsequent formation of the United Democratic Front. He became a key leader of strikes, boycotts, and other grassroots efforts, which, during the 1980s, reverberated throughout the country and were instrumental in creating the national and international climate that defeated apartheid. Jack's willingness to subject himself to repeated imprisonment and the rigors of extended hunger strikes earned him the loyalty of South African blacks and the respect of the white community, which eventually included him in key negotiations. In the early 1990s, Jack earned an honors degree in economics and development studies at Sussex University in Britain and is now a successful businessman in Port Elizabeth.

Janet Cherry

Janet Cherry was born and raised in Cape Town, South Africa and became politically active while studying at the University of Cape Town in 1980. She was involved in the Wages Commission, doing support work for independent black trade unions, and in worker education and adult literacy programs in Crossroads and Nyanga townships. In school, she ran the student printing press as a member of the Student Representative Council. In 1982, she was recruited into the African National Congress (ANC) underground. Then in 1983, she was elected General Secretary of the National Union of South African Students. At that time, she was involved in discussions around the formation of the United Democratic Front (UDF) and the End Conscription Campaign (ECC).

In 1984, Janet Cherry relocated to Port Elizabeth to set up an adult education program working with youth and women's organizations, as well as trade unions. She was also chair of a UDF area committee before UDF meetings were banned in March of 1985. At that time, she worked to set up a Port Elizabeth ECC branch, of which she was chairperson. When her adult education program was stopped, she worked with others to set up a Crisis Information Center, doing support work for people detained or who had disappeared during the uprising. Cherry herself was detained in 1985, in 1986-7, and again in 1988 before being put under house arrest in 1989. In

recognition of her work as a young activist, Janet Cherry was one of the first recipients of the Reebok Human Rights Awards in 1988.

In the early 1990's Janet Cherry worked for human rights and democracy NGOs IDASA and Black Sash, and was vice-chair of the ANC Walmer branch before moving to Grahamstown to lecture in Political Studies at Rhodes University. Then in 1996 and 1997 she worked as a researcher for the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Since 1998 she has been lecturing in Development Studies at University of Port Elizabeth. She continues to be involved in human rights work, as a member of Amnesty International and conducting research on human rights policy. Janet Cherry is currently researching for a doctorate in political sociology, on political participation in Kwazakele township, Port Elizabeth.

Col. Lourens du Plessis
South Africa Defence Forces (Ret.)
Col. du Plessis grew up in the rural area of the Eastern Cape Province. His long military career spanned almost four decades, from the early 1950s until 1991. In 1967 du Plessis became a Staff Officer in the Headquarters of Eastern Province Command in Port Elizabeth and in 1985 he was appointed Senior Staff Intelligence Officer. That same year Col. du Plessis authored the infamous signal recommending the "permanent removal from society" of Mathew Goniwe and his associates as a matter of urgency. Goniwe was an educator and civic leader who led protests in the township of Lingelihle and attempted to organize other small towns. In late June of 1985, the bodies of Goniwe and several other activists were found near Port Elizabeth. During the second inquest into the Goniwe killings Col. du Plessis was a key witness giving evidence to the effect that the signal meant that Goniwe and others had to be killed and not just transferred. Starting in 1989, du Plessis worked undercover as Managing Director of various South African Permanent Force (SAPF) front organizations in the Eastern Cape. He retired in 1991 after all front organizations were exposed and forced to close down.

The political rapprochement that brought genuine democracy to South Africa was not the fruit of a unilateral victory by the black opposition. It sprang from the understanding by both opposition and government leaders that victory through belligerent force was not possible. The opposition came to realize it could not smash the regime, certainly not with any violence at its disposal, and the regime knew it could not annihilate the opposition, not after years of contending with protestors, civic organizers, and committees on every other street corner of the townships.

Nonviolent sanctions were an indispensable link in the chain of events that ended the old order. Stay-aways, strikes and boycotts put pressure on white business owners and employers, and they undermined white attachment to the status quo. Rent boycotts defunded local councils, and street committees usurped their functions. Faced with this variegated challenge, the regime reacted with open force. Repression subdued the civics and committees, but it also cost the regime any chance of avoiding economic punishment by the international community. Nonviolent power did not by itself bring down the curtain on white rule, but it discredited the regime's authority and compromised its strategy for shielding apartheid from the many forces arrayed against it.

In his trial in April 1964, before he was imprisoned by the apartheid regime, Nelson Mandela argued that fifty years of nonviolent action by black South Africans until that time had not secured their rights but had only, it seemed, worsened the repression. He said that his followers were losing confidence in the policy of nonviolence and turning, disturbingly, to terrorism. Since the government was not flinching from brutality, he concluded that "as violence in this country was inevitable, it would be unrealistic and wrong for African leaders to continue preaching peace and nonviolence at a time when the Government met our peaceful demands with force." [1]

Mandela was right: Preaching peace is never a strategy for winning a conflict. But if Mandela believed that nonviolent action is the opposite of force, he was not right — it is in fact another form of force. Principled preference for nonviolent methods does not, by itself, give them force, and taking nonviolent action in order to avoid using violence does not make it successful. What does work, and what worked in South Africa twenty years after Nelson Mandela delivered his valedictory on the first half century of the struggle, is mobilizing a movement that makes it impossible for arbitrary rulers to control life in the communities where people live and alienating those rulers from the support they need at home and abroad. "Despite all of the rhetoric of the ANC about the armed struggle," explained Janet Cherry, herself an underground member of the ANC, "it was, in fact, the activities of the UDF, in mass organization, which brought about the change in South Africa." [2]

The nonviolent legacy of the twentieth century is embedded in the histories of many nations, but many of the ideas and strategies that were its substance first germinated in South Africa, in the thoughts and actions of an Indian lawyer who felt the strop of bigotry laid on his own back, as the century was dawning. So it is altogether fitting that before the century ended, the conflict that Gandhi began to fight in South Africa before he rallied to his own country's cause was finally won for all people of color in that land - and was won in part through strikes, boycotts, and other methods of resistance that he had pioneered.

"I suppose that human beings looking at it would say that arms are the most dangerous things that a dictator, a tyrant needs to fear," concluded Desmond Tutu. "But in fact, no - it is when people decide they want to be free. Once they have made up their minds to that, there is nothing that will stop them."[3]

On becoming an activist, and the evolution of his philosophy:

I started being an activist immediately after I arrived in Port Elizabeth by default actually, not by design, because I came from the farms of Port Elizabeth, just about 40 kilometers away from here. And the pass law prevented me from getting, enrolling into the public schools in town because, as you know, the pass law used to restrict the movement of black people. If you were on the farms, you were tied to the farms. If you were in the city, you were tied to that particular city. You could not walk outside that place after say 6:00 p.m. or so without a permit, and you couldn't go to white residential areas at night without a permit. You would be arrested. So for me, it meant that I couldn't come into high school education because there was no high school on the farms where I came from. So as a result of that, obviously it confronted me, apartheid confronted me head on. And I couldn't run away from it. I had a choice whether to go back to

farm life which was as far as we were concerned equivalent to slave life. It was tantamount to being a slave. And I refused that. Or I could face running battles with the security police or land up in jail. And that's what happened.

It was education because I was already delayed by round about 10 years. That was because you know staying on the farms you had to grow enough to walk the distance because school was not near. It was very, very far, and I was determined to go to school, and I overcame that distance there. And then I find myself in the big city here. And then that's when I thought when I was told that I couldn't, then automatically I found myself on the other side of the law.

Look, I mean it's funny. Despite [the fact] that I grew up on the farms, I happened to just hate it — discrimination, especially racial discrimination despite the fact that the penalty on the farm was very heavy. I had never heard of the word politics at that time before I came to the city. I had never heard of Nelson Mandela or the African National Congress which is the ruling party today, Nelson Mandela's organization. I had never heard of that. I had never heard of the events of the 1960s. So I was just raw, I mean I knew nothing about politics, but despite that, when I was on the farms, I was always caught on the side of being disobedient and so on, I wouldn't let the white people trample over me. Or I would get myself into trouble with them which was always more to do with moral issues. You know like you can't get in this side, you get that side and I used to move in and get into trouble because I go into their side which I am told not to get into.

You see at the beginning, by that time after I had this confrontation about the state, I mean about the pass law... then automatically I went to look for refuge in the little organizations that were available, which I started to be curious about, which I didn't know, and I started to know what they were doing. And most of them at the time were black consciousness organizations which were instilling a sense of pride and of walking tall if you're black. Don't allow the situation, anybody to push you down and that kind of thing. Automatically that started to inculcate into us the idea that, that race was an issue, you know, at the time. We started by seeing all white people, you know, as being culprits in our situation. And then of course I developed into that. Most of the current leadership in South Africa that you find of my generation had went through that phase of believing that the problem was just, whites were the problem and they could not be part of the solution as we said at the time.

But, come around about 1979, then we started, the ANC started really to come back to the young people in the country to introduce itself to our generation which we have no connection with you know. Because it was banned in the 60s. And then that was the time when the philosophy of non-racialism came into play. What it meant really, from a struggle point of view, was that people could not be judged by the color of their skin but they should be judged by their actions. And then slowly, of course, some of us started to move faster than the others. My friends were quick to embrace this philosophy, and they started really to move back into the non-racial mode which was espoused by the African National Congress, or the ANC.

But then of course I was very influential at school and with my colleagues and so on. I couldn't turn around like that because I believed that the philosophy of black consciousness was

necessary, it was correct. So I took of course a long process before I really, but the final nodal point, the real thing that made me turn and change my views, is one of my friends, was in my class. He was a proponent of non-racialism. And I was a black consciousness apostle in the school. And then in a public debate one day, you know, which I used to be very effective in destroying opponents in the debate. And my friend after I defeated him, you know, in this big hall, packed. I could say, "Well, we're black men; you're on your own," what not, you know, sloganeering. And really destroying his debate about, about white people being, also can be good people. And then he told me a story about Bram Fisher. Bram Fischer was an Afrikaner [white] lawyer who comes from the ruling families of the Afrikanerdom, and he sacrificed his life, landed himself in jail, was sentenced to life imprisonment, and he died in prison. The police never released him, and then my friend told me this story aside, not in public, and then he said to me, "Would you choose now this man as your comrade or a person just because his skin is black; and then he [mentioned some] of the notorious black policemen, and the black stooges who were working with the regime to implement the apartheid laws in the Bantustans; the Bantustans are the areas which were demarcated for black people, the homelands, as we called them. And that was the thing that changed me really to believe that, yes it was true you couldn't judge people by their color, by the color of their skin, but by their actions, by their actions.

We were being told at this time, this was at the time when we were really as young people getting restless about the apartheid system, and you could hear any story you could listen to. Like I mean the criticism of the ANC at the time, that it is run by Jews and some white communists and therefore they were actually not helping the situation, that's what you know the detractors of the ANC were saying. And therefore they, it was appealing to say, "Hey, black man, you can only save yourself if you rely on yourself, not on anybody else." That was very attractive, and it says that you cannot have a people who are part of the problem to be part of the solution. Those kinds of clichés are, are appealing. But, as I say, I mean the, the ANC at the time, I mean many of its people were in prison, banned at the time and so on. But slowly they were coming out now to reach out to this new generation.

On the decentralized nature of the new anti-apartheid movement:

You see, at the beginning, after 1976, it was mostly spontaneous — the activities that used to take place. There was at that time, when the uprising of 1976 happened, there were small organizations, but there were not mass organizations. So, from the experience of that, by 1978, then we started to really now to consolidate the big organizations you know because we felt that it wasn't a good thing to operate loosely. I mean, you will find in 1976, you will find that in some areas, there was not a single structure. People just went walking into the street, and spontaneity and leaders will erupt there and just control it and the police come and pick them up and the organization is gone or that effort is gone. So what we, we did, we learned from that, was to, to consolidate the organization now and build it, from what I call a center. And build outward and in so doing really build a lot of cadres of the organization — people who understand what we want to achieve, not people who just come occasionally, you know. But then those people become very strong to maintain the organization regardless of what happens. So that's why it became so difficult for the government to defeat, for example, actions such as the boycott. And later on when the UDF, the United Democratic Front which was founded when it had a strong core of organization. And as this organization broadened and broadened and broadened and

broadened, it became extremely difficult for the security forces to crush these people. Because now you have created a big, big center of resistance within the community. And then slowly you started [to include everyone] in the struggle for justice. And slowly everyone saw his role in the various methods of struggle that were available to us.

You see what we did, we started to have what we call educational lessons. These struggle lessons, where we will play films about other struggles of other people, where we will look into, whether it was Asia, Africa, or Latin America to see how various struggles were fought. And then we will have books, clandestine, and then read these books and share amongst ourselves and get to "conscientize" each other and other people as to what to do, and not to do. Such a thing helped the cadres when they were arrested by the security police.

Let's say you know that I am hiding in the house next door. And your responsibility, we know that you cannot resist torture forever, but what we are saying to you, you will have to, if the police are torturing you and then you give in to them. And you will have three plans. The first one: you take them widely and you must be you must budget for terrible assault from the police when you get there you don't find this person. It must be a plausible story that you say that so and so my friend I know is there, ok? When you get there, they get convinced and then they take you back. And they, they suspect or they correctly think that you misled them. And then you say ok, you give in now. Ok, fine, I'm going to cooperate with you guys. Then you take them to the next place. When they get there and they don't find that person, the people there immediately contact the place where the, the person the police are looking for is hiding. And then he moves on. Let's say maybe, whether hours or days — by the time you reach him there, at the final place where they really will believe you, that they cracked you and you have given in — they get there, they don't find the person. You saved the other person to go again. Poof. And the police can't catch him.

That is how we protected each other, you know. And the other thing, if the people are detained we said that our plan is to make sure that we've got sufficient people who can move in. And close a vacuum immediately — take the space, you know, the moment the police move. So that discourages the police from thinking that attacking the heads, the leaders, it helps. And that has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt that that strategy worked during the boycott period because that's what actually happened. It got snowballed and the moment they took us away, it just went on and on and on and on until they had to release us.

On his decision to fight nonviolently:

I have resigned myself to be effective in a nonviolent manner. That means that the struggle of South Africa as I said raises a number of different facets and people have fought in different ways. And I have elected to fight in a nonviolent manner. And in that way, I think we made a big, big impact.

That's why they have the various components or methods, because it was so individual. To me surely it wasn't going to suit me to be in uniform. Or carry guns. But it suited me to face the police with their guns with bare hands. And I believe that worked, and I think we made a very

strong impression. And very quickly also. And it was sensational because there was no excuse for anybody old or young. Disabled or not. Everybody was able to participate in the struggle, and people were satisfied because a lot of other people were put off by the other [violent] methods of struggle. Because if you are old you cannot be involved, if you are crippled you cannot be involved, if you are a coward you cannot. All sorts of things. So in a way this method was all embracing. You could get everybody. That's why it was proven beyond a reasonable doubt that it works. It draws a lot of people into the struggle. And as a result, everybody correctly claims that they made their contribution to the struggle, for where we are.

On planning the boycott:

Now I must say the idea [for the boycott] didn't come from me, definitely. But what I did, I perfected the implementation of the boycott, that's what I did. When the boycott was started, ultimately the decision was taken, that the boycott would be followed. Then I was given the job to execute that plan and that's what I did. Of course it came as the police were killing our people here in the townships — the townships is the areas which are designated by the apartheid government for black people. There was a frustration in the township as to what was happening. There was a serious confrontation with young people fighting with the police with their bare hands. You know and police shooting at them without mercy. And then, really, we said, "Look, look, look this is going too far." And then we said let us expose these policemen for what they are. Let us take this fight in the townships away, and bring it right to their homes. And that is what led to the boycott. And that decision was approved and seen as an effective way of doing it. That's when we started to plan and implement it. And it just had the right results because when every family — white family was affected — and it was not being restricted only to buying. We were planning other methods of continuing, so all the white families for a change, started to say, "Yes, it's coming to hit me now." And then they started to put pressure into their various structures, to their so-called representatives, you know, their racial representative in their racist parliament at the time. And so on and so on. And then things started the ball rolling.

There were various committees. I know for a fact that it was a group of women that started it — simple, not sophisticated at all. Black women, mothers, domestic workers who were trying to confront the police, or making marches and walking to the police station, and talking to the police to stop this thing. And there was nothing coming up and then all of a sudden one day they brought this idea to the organization, which was the Port Elizabeth main youth organization, PEYCO [Port Elizabeth Youth Congress] it was called at the time, which was an affiliate of the United Democratic Front. And they went also to other organizations that were involved in the liberation struggles such as the civic bodies, and the women's organizations and the student bodies. And then collectively, these groups said ok, fine, let us take this and do something about it. And then that's when a committee was formed, which I was elected to lead, and that's how we went about it.

In those days, I had no children. I had no home. I had nothing, so 24 hours of the day, I was running around from the police, but planning the struggle all the time. So for us, from a logistical point of view, if you look at it that time it was just a question of putting things together. I mean you wouldn't sleep in those days because you, you are thinking, you are working. You are scared

to sleep in one place because you're going to be caught and be arrested. So it was, you know, it was a harsh kind of situation.

The preparation was to [go to] the black businesspeople in the townships and tell them that we want them to stock the basic necessities that will be needed for this long-drawn struggle that we are going to face. And we told them then to drop their prices. And we told them that because of the volume, that's where they were going to make their profits. Although, I mean a profit at that time was not an issue for us, really. But anyway, we were sensitive that they were in business and therefore we, we were trying to say to them, "Ok look, go there and make it as comfortable as possible and with minimum inconvenience to yourselves," and so on. And we, we spoke to the bus drivers, taxi drivers, and we persuaded them that look, we would like you to discourage people carrying things from town and things like that. And if you can, tell them that you can't bring those things to the township because we have a boycott there. And of course we, we went to the church leaders. We spoke to the church leaders, and we persuaded them that they must also "conscientize" their people about this action. And the church liked the strategy anyway. And we went to the schools, convinced the children to convey the message to their parents who give leaflets out, and they had to take the leaflets explaining the things that we wanted. And for any exceptional circumstances, issues which were beyond peoples' control, on those things we were available to, to assist, as much as we could, on any thing if somebody needed help. Let's say if you were sick, you needed to go to a particular white doctor, you could speak to our office and our office will, will give you a go- ahead and will make it public and will make the public aware that we, you did consult us about that, and we approve of it, because of the circumstances that you gave us.

We did the preparation, where we were explaining to people what's going to happen. In those days remember we had no radio to announce what we say, we have no television to report what we say and we really relied on the meetings, you know... the house meeting, the street meeting and the area meeting whereby they will tell the people what's going to happen when and how, where are you going to get this so this shop does not serve this but it will be available at such and such a place and so on and so on. Because there are certain things which are not available in certain shops. People are concerned and those questions have to be answered. And I can tell you the next day they won't buy anything from town. They won't even buy even if they are hungry. They will wait until they get back home to get their slice of bread.

On the reaction to the boycott:

The entire township, imagine if you come, the situation became emotional and the police were right in, trying to crush the boycott in every possible manner, hunting for the leaders and doing these things, breaking peoples' homes and so on. Then what will happen? The people react to this. And then when you come to the township carrying bags, having purchased things in town, it happened that people will be… sometimes I think they were attacked. Although, although I can safely say as far as I'm concerned, if that boycott had succeeded on intimidation ... they would have crushed it there and then. And that would have been the easiest thing, to crush it. Intimidation could not help us. It could only weaken our position. So, the anybody who can believe that that boycott was strengthened by the hand of intimidation, he does not understand how South Africa operated at the time. Because the success of the boycott was a hands-off

approach and keeping to yourself and keeping your money in your pocket. You need nothing more than that. The moment you started to go out to give the police a good excuse of crushing your people, of crushing the boycott, then you would have lost it.

We had cards which all the shop keepers that we know, bona fide shop keepers, [they will have them] and then if they anybody question them, they will just say that the organizers of the boycott have given us this, and we are entitled to go and buy these things in town to sell them here. But they were buying from wholesalers, not buying from everybody.

The black businessman, he made money out of this situation, I think. They made a lot of money, but unfortunately some of them never knew that we were acting, we were politicians, we were guided by political objectives, not by profit objectives. So when, when we felt that our political objectives were nearly achieved then we, we stopped the boycott and then some of the businessmen they burned their fingers because of their conspicuous consumption on the profits that they were making at the time. But we warned them that we would not seek permission from them. We will be guided by our political objectives so... hence, when we stopped the boycott, we were not nice guys to some businessmen.

On high prices and profiteering:

Yes, there was that problem, but whenever it happened, we quickly dealt with it. And we had our monitors on the ground, activists who were watching the prices, how they were escalating. We created a band in which they could operate the prices. Should it get out of that band, you had to rectify that or else you would have been put on the black list immediately. So people were very careful not to, it wasn't to their advantage to do so.

On suspending the boycott:

Originally we thought that it could happen very fast, and stop. But unfortunately it dragged on and on. But we stopped it in December of 1985. And that was just at the, you know that is the peak time, Christmas purchases and so on. To a great extent, it was really to save the white businesses at the time because on my walks about in town, white families came to me and stopped me in the street and dragged me into their shops, brought their mothers, their sisters, their wives, their children and their grandmothers. And put it to me, that look, we could not survive if the boycott goes an extra week, we will be finished. All our possessions that we had will be gone. Please, we are not the government. It was then that we said ok, fine. Look, I mean, we were not intending to antagonize these white people. But our idea was just to drive our point home. And then of course, I took it back to my committee and I presented the human, the consequences to the individual, and we said, "Okay, look we cannot be as bad as this government." These are our people; these are of course they are beneficiaries of apartheid patronage. Nonetheless it's our people, let's not destroy them.

Then we stopped that boycott at that time. And you see when you stop it, of course also it served two purposes. The pressure on our constituency to go and shop for Christmas was going to lead to some cracks within our own ranks, or even within the organization, with the broad masses. So

we hit two birds with one stone, saved those people, and also kept our unity intact for the next fight.

There was an opposition to this decision as you would — the first people to, to object to it obviously would have been those who were making the super profits out of, out of this action. And they of course and some others who genuinely politically believe it was the wrong political decision. But we were so strong at the time, we prepared to budget for, you know we wouldn't be swayed by these people because at that time we could take what we believed was the correct decision although we knew that we could be criticized by quite a number of people. But they were by far a tiny minority and that is why we managed that process very easily, without any damage to ourselves or anyone. And then when we recalled the boycott after five months, I think, then we had the entire population behind us.

To inflict the pain when the people that we're hitting, we were convinced that the message as far as they are concerned, they've got it. Now to continue hammering them, it was going to defeat the purpose of what we were doing because we are just going to turn them against ourselves. And that would have been a sad story. And we didn't want to turn them against us. We want them to be on our side. And I think the way we conducted the boycott was to catch them to our side. And we did succeed on that. And to continue the boycott further than that, because we were succeeding, we are doing everything would have defeated the entire purpose of showing that we are fighting a just struggle. Because that was at the bottom at the end of the day. We as the strugglers, we had to maintain or uphold certain standards. And those standards, amongst them were to be a credible people who are sane and not going on a blind vengeance against people. But we were seeing to rectify the wrongs of our society.

I have spoken to them. They have phoned me. I have gone to their offices whenever they called me and say, "Look, say here. I myself personally, now my business situation is like this and like this and therefore I am not responsible for this. I don't know what was happening. But, it is true that since you have the boycott, now I see the atrocities of the police which is what you wanted to achieve," and, and all sorts of things you know. And of course we, they were talking, there are people work with them. The people who know them, they say hi look so and so really they are feeling the pinch and they really have changed.

They had in those days, they had members of parliament who were trying to say to them, "Tough it out." The politicians were saying from the top, "Forget about it. We will ignore them. Ignore that boycott; it's just going, we're going to break it, okay?" And this didn't work. They started to put pressure; they started to set up a committee of concerned people, a committee of 21, a committee of 30. But all those committees were a very positive phenomenon for us. Because they were showing that we are succeeding in our objective, because you see if you are struggling, the main thing in the struggle is to get attention. To struggle in a corner where nobody pays attention to you is a useless effort. You have got to attract as much attention as you can to your cause. So that people can judge it whether it's a, a just one or not. And they spoke to their MPs and the minister of police was brought down although he was still talking tough, not compromising. He said to them, "Don't worry, we'll crush them." But they said, "You are not going to crush them. We are going to be crushed by them." The minister said, "I will crush them." They say, "You are not going to crush them; we are going to be crushed by the boycott."

And that was it. And the police, the minister went away and they called upon the president, they wrote letters to the then president and, and they kept on you know, things that they would have never done before. And they started to call us to their meetings to come and speak and answer. And we went to their meetings, and we gave answers. We told them what to, what the whole thing was all about.

We had concrete demands, and these demands dealt in those days with simple things when you look at them today — like opening of public amenities or facilities to all races, taking out of the troops from the townships. Making this available whatever was not available, and end discrimination in the work place, et cetera. And we also had what we called long term, at the time, you know like talking about Mandela's freedom. People were like, "Oh my goodness, this is something [for] my child, because other people will discourage us about this. No, no leave that. That's impossible" And we say release Nelson Mandela, un-ban the political organizations. Let the exiles return back into the country. We threw all those demands into the pot, and these are the things that we were saying that must happen.

Look, this whole thing, the struggle is about symbolism rather than tangible things. You know the symbolism of you saying, committing yourself to, first of all to this philosophy of freedom. And I think many of them [the white businessmen] expressed that in public. Many of them expressed that in the newspapers and the radio and the television which they had to talk on. And they did express their approval of our action, and they said unfortunately we happen to be caught in the crossfire. We just become the pawns you know.

On the cumulative effect of the boycott, and meeting with white businessmen:

It did help because, remember the building blocks for the release of Mandela and unbanning of organizations was a combination of these efforts all put together. It was the… you see the struggle has a cumulative effect on the target. It's not a one-bang thing, you know? It's an ongoing process that ripples. It's a psychological game that you make. These psychological games translate themselves into the tangibles. But at the beginning you operate and you have to understand what I call symbolism, the psychological victories and the main thing ... I mean for the first time when we went to these meetings with these businessmen, of course we organized some ties, some nice suits. I remember I bought a suit urgently to go and meet the businessmen. In those days, the idea was we have to look presentable, and then we went to this place. I mean in the chamber and then when we got there which was a culture of business you know to make nice food available.... When we got in there, that to us was sort of like intimidation you know because we are not used to that kind of food. It was like you know we, we are already committing a crime by feeding ourselves. It was like compromising, compromising ourselves by having these cocktail prawns, and these expensive drinks, things like that. It looks absolutely absurd to us at the time.

We'd get inside and then we start to introduce each other and then of course the businessmen, they will say what's your problem and then we put them the situation and they will respond and tell us, "Look guys, we identify now with your problem. Most of our members would have never paid attention to the demands of black people. It is true that we haven't even been aware of what

was happening in the township. There are atrocities that the police have committed; we were insulated from that. And therefore please bear with us. We are mere businesspeople. We want to go on with what we know best, our business. We are not politicians." And so on and so on. And then we will say "No, but you are the beneficiaries of that political system. Show me that you reject it. Show me that you are with us, and then together we're going to do something. And then we will work out some collective strategy," and so on, whatever, of trying to meet a particular minister and, and the minister would not bow you know it would just believe that these are troublemakers. We're not going to talk to them. And shut the door....

They were sincere. I can tell you that they were sincere. Look I mean in those days in this country, the television, I can read you an extract from a letter written by a journalist to his editors. This journalist came from Canada, and came to report here. Got a job in the local newspaper, and then he was complaining of a the editor not using a story, a meeting which I addressed which was attended by what was estimated to be something like 85,000 to 90,000 people who are going to stop the rugby match here which was going to be played — through nonviolent methods. And they wrote this report for the newspaper. The report is on the story of the meeting and... this journalist was complaining that how can you keep the people informed? How will they know what's happening in this country? If 85,000 people, this is not newsworthy, it's unbelievable. That is where the newspapers sometimes came in. But of the current sometimes collaborators as or I don't know what is a nicer word to use instead of collaboration but they were sort of sometimes going along with the flow of the regime. And as a result, the reporting was always negative. Before that, no black leader has ever been portrayed as a leader, other than as a troublemaker in the township. And it was after the boycott, then all of a sudden, there were black leaders and they were treated with respect for the first time by the press and by white people. Before that there was nothing like a black leader.

On prison:

I spent all in all five and a half years in detention, that means in and out. The shortest period will be something like 14 days, and the longest was three years. And in solitary confinement, the longest I spent was nine months where you don't talk to anybody, don't see anybody; you stay in darkness. You don't see anything. We call it solitary confinement. And yeah, that's the kind of life we lived. Look, we at that time, I tell you, we knew you could die any moment but I was not scared to die. Any time when I die, I didn't care. That goes with everybody at the time, of our age. I mean if you tell about death now, any dangerous thing I'm so scared. But in those days, no way, all my friends were dying next to me, left and right. The enemy was hitting at us all the time, but I was never, we were never scared.

I was banned for five years. I challenged that. Luckily that fell off quickly. And then after that fell off, I got locked up again. And that was locked up for the long three years. But when we were in the State of Emergency because we were so many, then we were given the same food as the normal criminals. Although we were kept separately from them because, I mean there were thousands of us there. Actually, they emptied the prison for that matter, just to accommodate all of us. And a lot of us were also kept in police stations, so we were quite a number of people.

Under the State of Emergency because, although you know it was sections and sections of the prison, within your sections we were allowed to mingle. But we would be integrated later on. First with me, let's say if they arrest me today, they'll keep me on my own let's say for about six months or so, in solitary confinement. And then after that, they reintegrate me with the rest of the others. That means the people from the leadership.

You see what happened, what the police do when such an action is imminent, once they hear about the intentions, let's say of a boycott, the first thing the planners of the boycott have prepared for themselves before they take the word to the next group of people, they arrange safe places to hide, you see. Where you will spend a half night here and a half night there and a night there and a night there. That is point number one because as far as the police are concerned and their modus operandi was that first of all you tackle the leadership. They saw this worked in the 60s when they crushed the ANC leadership. Now, they were always banking on that strategy. But we have taken preemptive action to avoid that by creating numerous layers of leadership which will make it extremely impossible to crush the program, once it's started, by arresting the leaders. And helping that is the fact that leaders themselves are on the run, which if you look are on every occasion, I was always arrested last because I could dash, run away, and not be caught for a long time. And then you operate underground, hiding and then you keep on until of course they take rooters out one by one, you know I mean catch us like they did me.

On meeting with businessmen while on the run from police:

Of course, once the police launch the offensive there are no negotiations possible, although because we are sympathetic to the business people, we would go and risk and move out of our holes, and go and meet businessmen. We did that. That was a massive favor at the time.

And a lot of people didn't understand why we would do that anyway because they said, "Why are you risking your lives because you can be killed, you can be locked up," and so on. For these businessmen because they are crying for their profit. But all the time we were guided by the, the idea of saying that let us detach these people from the apartheid government and throw them into a bag of activists that are opposed to apartheid.

That's what happened and that was very significant in those days, to have a businessman stopping his business, going around, doing what our mothers had been doing over the years. Going to cry for us to the police, please release my child, please do that. That was extremely significant. Psychologically, symbolically, and that is what we wanted to achieve. And then having a respected businessman going, now looking for these people that have been described as hooligans and as thugs. Now the businessman says "These leaders [have] got legitimate grievances. If they have committed a crime, take them in front of the court of law and try them and find them guilty or innocent. Don't just lock them up, don't just do that." And that's what the boycott did. And now in the white community when the big businessman like that speaks, they listen. If the big businessman respects these people, they respect him, and that is how we achieve also the respect of the leaders at the time.

On the State of Emergency declaration:

What it did it also you know raised our morale because as we were saying we want to see the regime moving. There must be a movement. Whether that movement is in what direction but what we could not handle is a stalemate where nothing is moving. If they declare a State of Emergency, they were panicking because they were we were becoming effective, they were feeling us coming, they were feeling us coming. So to us, the State of Emergency showed that the country could not be governed as in the old days. Extraordinary measures were to be implemented in order to keep apartheid alive. And we knew then, that we got apartheid in a crisis. And apartheid was in a crisis and we were there, we were there to give it the push, to push, to push. So when the first State of Emergency was declared, it was declared I think few weeks after the boycott, the first one. And then when the second State of Emergency was declared, also just weeks after the boycott had resumed, so that clearly showed that we were becoming very effective, and ordinary people were starting to see now the gains that we were making.

On the role of nonviolent mass movements in the end of apartheid:

Yes, the political consciousness of people will breed those conditions for all sorts of elements of struggle. That you cannot deny; because I mean the higher level of political consciousness, as you know classical guerrilla movement or whatever. Because anyway you got to have those conditions. I mean if you want to rise, you can create those conditions. But unfortunately we were not responsible for that. The apartheid regime put itself in that situation. Because, I mean, we wanted it to be crushed and be finished in whatever way. And I played my role in the best way I believed I could make my contribution. And everybody had his own way, method - sanctions, where one element which is similar to this mass mobilization of people. And other people chose to use arms. Those were all what the ANC in later years called the four pillars of the revolution which the South African, they analyzed the South African struggle, to be dependent upon those what they call the four pillars of the revolution. They were working together but I would say that the mass mobilization of the people and the creation of the spirit of ungovernability which emanates from mass mobilization and the international isolation of South Africa were the critical elements which were impacting more even than the military action against this government I think — in South Africa at least.

From the website of A Force More Powerful:
http://www.pbs.org/weta/forcemorepowerful/safrica/

Attachment B: Nonviolent Strategies Brainstorm Ideas

To get the brainstorm going the educator might ask the students to pick a person the class has studied and list strategies they used. For example,

1. Gandhi:
media, fasting, letter writing, compassion, public speeches, self-discipline, boycotts

2. MLK:
sit-ins, public speeches

3. Dorothy Day
choosing a different life style, choosing not to be a part of a system by living in poverty, helping the poor

Ask students to think about nonviolent movements / actions that have happened recently in Colorado. For example:

1. Anti-War Movement
die ins, speeches, vigils, marches, puppet theater

2. Sweatshop Campaigns

3. Fair Trade and Alternative Buying
Human Bean

Other actions that may go on the list
Media activities
Non cooperation
Day Laborer Center in Colorado
Tax Resistance
Public Theater
Plow Shares
SOAW (School of the Americas Watch, www.soaw.org)
Kensington Welfare Rights (www.kwru.org)

Plow Shares
A nuclear disarmament movement begun in 1980 drawing from the biblical passage „to beat swords into plowshares," activists commit acts of civil disobedience by entering onto military bases and weapons facilities and symbolically and actually disarming components of US nuclear weapons systems.

Civil disobedience usually consist of hammering or pouring blood on nose cones of missiles, computers, documents, etc.

Not all participants see their actions coming from a biblical base rather they're motivated by a commitment to nonviolence or by other spiritual or moral convictions.

Actions have taken place in the US, Australia, Germany, Holland, Sweden, and England

Objective is to educate people through the process of civil disobedience, going to court for their actions, and going to prison. Educate people about their convictions regarding the power of nonviolence and the destructiveness of weapons

Response to accusation that plowshares actions are violent:
"Nuclear weapons and all weapons of war are anti-life and therefore are inherently evil and have no right to exist. Thus it is the responsibility of people of faith and conscience to begin to nonviolently dismantle these weapons."

"The real crime is not the hammering upon weapons, but the US government's first-strike nuclear policy, its military interventionist policy, and its commitment to wage a war against the poor of the world to protect its economic interests."

From Plowshares homepage www.swords-to-plowshares.org

Attachment C: Questions for A Force More Powerful – South Africa 1985

1. Who were the people and groups involved in supporting or challenging apartheid in South Africa?

2. What were those challenging apartheid trying to achieve?

3. What nonviolent strategies did they use?

4. Why did they choose these strategies?

5. Do you think these strategies are still relevant today?

6. Who were the people and groups involved in supporting or challenging apartheid in South Africa?

Janet Cherry- member of ANC
Bishop Tutu
White business leaders

7. What were those challenging apartheid trying to achieve?

Put scenario to them personally, you live in your neighborhood you are tied there, can't go to school because there are none in you neighborhood, military there to enforce law, positions of

power all white even though a small % of population, removal of security forces, free Nelson Mandela.

8. What nonviolent strategies did they use?

Boycotts, negotiation, non-cooperation

If students have trouble answering, ask them… "What did you see Jack doing?"
Civic organization, taxi drivers=all, began to realize they had a role AND the power. Built their confidence.
Negotiated = put forth demands

9. Why did they choose these strategies?

Wanted to extend it white areas to sensitize them, expose them to suffering by black S. Africans. By just using violence, this wasn't a serious threat to the state and most whites weren't aware of it anyway. By using non-violence and part. In the boycott which put pressure on the bus community they brought the state to a point where it had to use violence and "extraordinary means" to maintain apartheid. The apartheid state never created a threat to the state more that there violence.

10. Do you think these strategies are still relevant today?

Attachment D: Questions to crumple in a ball and throw for students to answer

List of questions for crumpled ball exercise

1. Who was M. Jack?
2. Who were the people and groups supporting apartheid?
3. Who were the people and groups challenging apartheid?
4. What were those challenging apartheid trying to achieve?
5. What non-violent strategies did they use?
6. Why did they use these strategies?
7. How did the government respond?
8. What is the connection between the efforts in S. Africa to end Apartheid and Gandhi's efforts?
9. What are your reactions to the film?
10. Are these strategies relevant? Explain.